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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY CO·.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff a;n,d Appella.nt,
-vs.-

LEijAND J. THOMPSON,
Defendant and R,espondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as the respondent-defendant Leland J.
Thompson controverts the appellant's statement of facts
in certain particulars, he is obliged to 1nake his own
statement on controverted matters.
At the outset it n1ust be noted that this action is
essentially one in which the defendant seeks to recover
1noney on a contract: narnely, a fire insurance policy,
even though the appellant corporation initiated the proceedings seeking to have the policy declared void, and
to recover, as on quaisi-contract, $2,000.00 already paid
defendant as partial settlement on a fire loss. The plaintiff's defenses to the defendant's clain1 on the policy
are (1) that l\[r. Thornpson never owned, or before the
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renewal of the policy, he had parted with all interest
in the insured building, and thenceforth had no insurable
interest therein; and (2) that the policy \vas void by
reason of defendant's rnisrepresentations as to ownership and encumbrances.
Issues were drawn on these affirn1ative defenses
and tried to a jury which brought in a special verdict
in favor of Mr. Thompson on all interrogatories propounded by the court.
On the issue of insurable interest the appellant
alleged that on Dece1nber 18, 1951, prior to the policy
renewal and the loss Mr. Thon1pson had ''sold and conveyed" 'the insured building to one ~fr. Hardy. Mr.
Thompson adn1itted that he had agreed to sell the building and that he had conveyed the land on which the unattached building was standing but denied that he had
sold or transferred the building and asserted that he had
possession and right of use plus an agreement with th~
executory buyer to protect and be responsible for the
building until it shall be delivered. He denied the alleged
misrepresentations.
In paragraph 4 of his counterclailn upon the policy
Mr. Thompson alleged that "the actual ctise value of
the property so destroyed and .subject to the policy of
insurance .aforesaid at the date of its destruction was:
as to the insured bu.ilding $2,000 . . . . . . . " (R . .8). In
its reply the appellant insurance con1pany formally
pleaded that ".answering paragraph 4, plaintiff admits
the i.nsu-red buildring was of the value of $2,000 ......''
(R. 10). Thus no issue was raised as to the value of the
2
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building for the purposes of settlernent of the policy
obligation. Both parties tried the case upon the theory
that appellant's only contention was that Mr. Thompson
had no insurable interest in the building. It is true that
son1e evidence "\vas presented with respect to the value
of the building, but this was admissible and was subInitted only on the issue of insurable interest, under
\Vhich it was necessary that IV[r. Thompson show that
he had a "'substantial econo1nic interest." It is obvious
that the value of the building is material on whether
or not Mr. Thou1pson's interest was a substantial econolnic interest, and an objection to the evidence on the
ground that it was -not "\vithin the issues could not properly have been sustained.
On page 2 of appellant's brief it is asserted that
'"it -vvas discovered" that the defendant had sold the
fra1ne building prior to the date of the fire, which sale
the co1npany had not been informed of at the time it
paid l\Ir. Thompson $2,000 for the loss. This statement
is not in accordance with the evidence or the finding of
the jury. On the sa1ne page appellant states that it was
further discovered that at the tirne the policy was originally procured the defendant was not the owner of
the building and had certain encurnbrances on other
property of which he had not advised the co1npany. This
~tate1nent also is contrary to the evidence and the finding of the jury.
On page 5 of appellant's brief it is said that "exaInination of the application, Exhibit D-10, reveals that
Leland Thompson was represented to be the owner of
3
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the fra1ne dwelling, the tractor and the co1nbine," and
that he did not own the f_r·ame dwelling at the tiu1e and
that the tractor was n1ortaged to the Far1n Ho1ne Administration which did not appear in the application
for the policy. The i1nplication contained in the quoted
clause is contrary to the evidence because Thompson did
not fill out or co1nplete or sign the application. This
was done entirely by Nick H. Topik, the agent for the
insurance ·con1pany (T. 7-! and 76; 115-116). Moreover,
Thompson told Topik about his contract with the Box
Elder County Labor Association at the tirne he applied
for the insurance (T 16). As will be hereinafter shown,
Mr .. Thompson was at the very least the beneficial owner
of the building at the ti1ne ; and he also told Topik about
the loan on the tractor ( T 20).
Again on pages 14 and 15 of its brief the appellant
declares that Thon1pson conveyed his entire interest in
the building to Mr. Hardy and that no consideration
was paid for the privilege Thompson had to keep the
possession and use of the building. The statement is
further made that this right to the use of the building
was revocable at any time by the owner. On page 15
it is further said that the land "and the building itself"
had been conveyed to Hardy and was completely within
his possession and control. All of these statements are
contrary to the evidence and to the findings of the jury.
On page 24 of its brief the appellant says that the building is "admittably worth only $1,000." That is contrary
to the admission of the parties and to the evidence of
value which was adn1itted on another issue. On page 25
4
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of its brief the appellant declares that Thompson was
guilty of rnisrepresentations in at least four respects,
(1) failure to reveal true ownership of the frame build-

ing and the encurnbrance on the tractor; (2) failure to
notify the co1npany of the transfer of his interest in
the building to IIardy; ( 3) 1nisrepresen tation of the
value of the building in the proof of loss, and ( 4) that
after the loss he misrepresented his interest in the building in the formal proof of loss by concealing the fact
that he had sold the building. All of these statements
are contrary to the evidence and the findings of the
JUry:
\Ve shall now attempt to summarize the evidence
on these controverted points with references to the reeord.
1Tirst, let us consider the transaction between
Thompson and the Box Elder County F'arm Labor Ast)Ociation by which he acquired the building in question.
Tho1npson acquired the building under a written contract, Exhibit D-4, ( T 35). By that contract, Exhibit
D-4, the Association agreed to and in fact did move the
building onto Thornpson's land for a consideration of
$225.00 plus fixtures costing $20.00. Thompson leased
to the Association a plot of ground suitable as a site.
The Association permitted Thompson to prepare the
building for occupancy and on that he spent a great
deal of rnoney. The contract further provides that when
the Association declares the labor housing emergency
5
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at an end Tho1npson 1night ac(1uire the building permanently upon payment of $100.00 or actual cost, whichever is highest, and the Association would give "rhompson a legal bill of sale. At the tin1e of the fire there was
nothing left for Thompson to do before he got the bill
of sale (T 36-37; 49).
The building was not fastened in any way to the
land owned by l\1r. Thon1pson and which was subsequently sold to Mr. Hardy. It was just set down and
propped up on one end by cement blocks. There were
no posts nor foundations, nor was there any excavating
to adapt the land to the bnilding (T 34). At the time
the policy vvas ordered l\fr. Topik was all around the
building and "took a look" at it (T 34 and T 7'7).
At the time the policy was ordered l\1r. Thompson
told Topik about the contract with the Association and
also told him that the Equitable Life and Causualty
Company had a Inortgage on the land but no interest in
the building, and Topik reported the mortgage on the
land to appellant's ho1ne office ( T 16-17; T 66-68; Exhibits D-10 and D-11). ·It is to be noted that Exhibit
D-10 prepared by Topik apparently from information
given him by Tho1npson, shows the real estate mortgage
of $4,000.00 on the land. Although Topik apparently
later advised the Company that the 1nortgage on the
land had been paid off, l\Ir. Thompson never so advised
him (T 116). As a matter of fact, sometime after the
oriignal insurance policy was issued the defendant became delinquent in his pay1nents on the real estate mortgage and was forced to sell the land to avoid foreclosure
6
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(T 17 -18). Accordingly through a real estate agent he
sold the fartn to l\Ir. Hardy. At the time the transaction
\vith Hardy vvas negotiated Hardy was given an alternative offer: he could take the land either with or without the building in question, and if he- took the building
\Yith the land, the price on the package deal wa.s to he
~~1,000.00 1nore than if he took the land without the buildIng.
Hardy decided to take the building with the land
at the increased price. However, at the time the transaction was negotiated Thompson explained to Hardy
that he did not yet have a formal transfer of the- building (T 25). ~foreover, at the time the deal was made it
was agreed between Tho1npson and Hardy that Thomp:-;on should reserve the possession and use of the building for the storage of his machinery until such time as
he could get the Inachinery conveniently removed and
for this he \Vas to n1ake it right with Hardy. At the
tiine of the fire the contract between Thompson and
Hardy for the sale of the building was still executory
(T 26-28; 33-34; 141-143). In fact Thompson was still
jn possession of the building and had never turned the
keys over to Hard-:v at the time of the fire (T 34; 141).
Hardy's boy wanted to move his machinery in there
in the :B-,all before the fire, but Hardy told hi1n be could
not move Thompson out and testified that even if he
\Vanted to use the building, he would not have pulled
Thompson's machinery out (T 146-147).
~l_1he

land i t~elf \vas deeded to Hardy on December
18, 1951 (T 32; Exhibit P-3).
7
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In the following SUllllner rrholnpson had not yet
been able to dispose of his machinery and Tho1npson,
feeling that he had perhaps withheld delivery of the
building for a reasonable ti1ne, went to see Hardy about
Thompson's continued use thereof. Under the circmnstances existing Hardy indicated he did not need the
building and that it 'vas alright for 'Thompson to go
on using it as he had. However, Hardy told Thompson
that inasmuch as he was storing iinpleinents with gasoline in the building he felt that Thompson should protect
and be responsible for the building during the time he
possessed and used it, and thereupon Thompson agreed
to protect and be responsible for the building while he
used it (T 37~38; T 145).
As a result of the loss after this agreement was
made Thompson feels that he owes Hardy for the building, and I-Iardy expects Tho1npson either to pay foT it
or replace it no matter what the result of this litigation
1nay be (T 27; T 147-148).
Some time in the late sun1mer or early fall of 1952
the appellant's agent, Nick Topik, came to see Mr.
Thompson about the renewal of the policy. He wanted
Thompson to give him a check for the renewal and
Thompson told him he intended to continue the insurance but he was not able to pay him that day, and he
then said to Topik, "I have sold the place but I still
have my building there. I still have my machinery there
and I am responsible for the building so I think I will
still carry the insurance." Topik as agent of the comthen advised Thon1pson as to the p-roper procedure. He
8
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told Thon1pson to write a letter and advise the con1pany
of what had been done and that if they wanted to issue
a nevv policy, they would do so from headquarters. A
little later Tho1npson followed the advice by writing the
letter, Exhibit D-6, to the appellant at its Denver office
(which \vas the office specified on the envelope sent
with his pre1niu1n notice) and sent the letter, with his
check for $19.60 for the pren1iu1n renewal and the pre1uiun1 notice or receipt, to the company through the regular Inails. In that letter Thompson stated to the company, .. I have sold the fa.rm) bu.t I am still using the
bttilding for storing 1ny nzachinery and thing,s until I
can nzoue to Idaho) so everything is the sa.me. I am still
r.es ponsible for the bttildi.ng until I move so I wish to
keep the insurance on it. Will you please change the
policy accordingly so I will still be protected." The
check, Exhibit D-7, he received in his next monthly bank
state1nent and in due course of n1ails he received in return fron1 the co1npany the renewal receipt, Exhibit D·-8
('11 39-44).
Mr. Jensen, Claims Manager for appellant corporation, testified that when the file on this policy was handed
to him after the loss the letter was not contained therein. However, his testin1ony as to the system for opening
1nail and filling letters in the company indicates that it
is very loose indeed and that there is ample opportunity
for such a letter to be misplaced or misfiled. It appears
that an average of so1ne four hundred renewal letters
are received each business day and opened by two clerks
\vho then pull the files and pass the documents on to
underwriters for consideration. In this process letters
9
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commented, Hthat's all there is to it, isn't it'?'' (T 177).
The appellant corporation excepted to son1e of the
instructions (T 179-80) but no\Yhere proposed that the
issue of the value of the building be sub1nitted to the
jury. It should be observed that the exceptions taken to
the court's instructions are not urged here.
The question of insurable interest in the building
at the ti1ne of obtaining the policy and at the time of the
fire loss was subn1itted to the jury with an instruction
that the phrase ''insurable interest" is defined as any
lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety
or preservation of the subject of the insurance free from
loss, destruction or pecuniary damage. This is in the
words of the Utah Statutory definition.
Upon the court's instruction the jury returned a
special verdict in answer to the interrogatories as follows:

1. The defendant on September 18, 1951, had "sold
but not conveyed" the building to Hardy.
2. The fact of said sale or conveyance was not
concealed fron1 and was not unknown to the plaintiff
or its agent at the time of policy renewal.
3. That the defendant did not misrepresent to the
plaintiff that the tractor was free and clear of all encumbrances at the ti1ne of applying for the original
policy.
4. That at the time of applying for the original
policy the defendant did not misrepresent to the plaintiff

12
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or its agent that he o\vned the fran1e building in question.
5. That neither the plaintiff con1pany nor its agent
relied upon the stateinents made by the defendant in the
proof of loss in 1naking payrnent to the defendant of the
sum of $2,000.00 on January 21, 1953.

*

*

*

*

8. 11 hat at the tin1e the defendant obtained the
insurance policy he did not have an insurable interest
in the building.
9. That at the tiine of the fire the defendant did
have an insurable interest in the building.
The verdict was unanin1ous (R 49-50).
Interrogatories 6 and 7 dealt with the values of the
1nachinery and are not relevant here.
Appellant corporation never filed a motion for a
ne\v trial.
The conditional order i'or a new trial (R 73) and the
order granting a new trial (R 76) were entered by the
court on its own n1otion entirely without notice to defendant and \vithout any opportunity to be heard as to
the propriety thereof before said orders were entered
(R 73; 76; 96-97).
Within ten days after the entry of the conditional
order and co-ternporaneously with the entry of the pereinptory order for a new trial the respondent Mr.
Thompson filed his \vri tten Inotion to amend the findings
13
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of the court by striking therefron1 the court's interpolated finding that the value of the building was $1,000.00 only and to vacate and set aside the conditional
order and the further order for a ne\v trial. After extended argument, both \vritten and oral, these motions
"\Vere granted and the judgn1ent originally entered on
the verdict "\vas reinstated. This appeal followed.
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT 1. The defen.dant-reszJondent did have an
insurable interest in the irn,su.red buildin. (] a.t the tinte
the policy was reneu;ed a.nd at the tin1e the loss occurred.
POINT 2. The defendant-respondent properly u:as
allowed to retain the $2,000.00 paid to him by appellant
as_ the value of the building.
POINT 3. The defendan.t-re.spondent 1nade no Jnisrepr,esenta.tion, and the policy is valid.
POINT 4. 1 he court properly vacated its erroneous order for a new trial on pla.intiff' s com.plaint.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. The defendant-respondent did have an
insurable interest in the insured bu.ilding at the tin1.e
the p·olicy wa.s renewed a.nd at the time the loss occurred.
At the outset it should be observed that the only
question here raised by appellant with respect to Mr.
Thompson's insurable interest is concerned with appellant's clain1 that prior to the rene"\val of the policy and
the loss of the building all of 1Ir. Thompson's interest
therein had been transferred to Th1r. Hardy at the same

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ti1ne the far1n \vas conveyed to him by deed. The theory
is that he previously had an insurable interest but parted with it at the tin1e he conveyed the real property.
It would see1n to be a sufficient answer to this contention that the question of this transfer (or "conveyance'' as it was styled by the court) to Hardy was subrnitted to the jury under proper instructions which, as
they are not here attacked, constitute the law of the
case, and the jury specifically found that the building
n·.(lS n.ot "conveyed" to Mr. Hardy when the real estate
was conveyed. To n1ake assurance doubly sure the jury
as the trier of the fact also specifically found that Mr.
Thontpson did ha.ve an i.nsurable interest in the buildilng
both at the tinte he obtained the policy and at the time
of the fire (T 28). It is readily apparent from the record
that these findings are a1nply supported by the evidence.
It is very apparent that the building in question was
not and never was intended to be a part of the real property. It \vas never affixed to the land in any way. No
foundations or posts or other installations were made
which \vould indicate any intention that the building
should be there permanently. The land was not excavated in any way to accommodate it. When installed
it was installed on land leased by the Labor Association
from nfr. Thompson. At the time Mr. Thompson was
forced to sell the land and was negotiating for the sale
of the sa1ne he was still contemplating hauling the building off and it was treated strictly as a temporary building and his personal property.

15
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Then \vhen l\Ir. Thon1pson \\·a~ forced to ~Pll his
farm he debated \vhether or not he \vould sell the building when he sold the real e~tate and he ronsidered hauling it away, but finally decided to give the purchaser
the choice of buying the building \Vi th the farrn in a
package deal, becan8e it \\Tould have cost him at least
$1,000.00 to haul the building to Idaho and $500.00 to
haul it to his other horne in Tre1nonton. Nevertheless,
at the time Tho1npson's deal with Hardy was negotiated
and in consideration of the 1nutual agreements made,
including the i1n1nediate conveyance of the real property,
it was agreed between th~ parties that Mr. Tho1npson
should reserve to himself the building in question with
the right to the use and occupation and the possession
thereof until such tirne as he could conveniently move his
machinery. The keys were not delivered and possession
was not given of this personal property. Hardy testified
that he never did get possession of the building. After
so1ne time and because Hardy had not made a transfer
of his title and possession of the building Mr. Thompson
and Mr. Hardy further agreed that title, possession and
right of use of the building should continue to be reserved, but that in view of some delay Mr. Thompson
should protect and be responsible for the building, obviously so that he could either make delivery or pay the
value of the same "\Vhen the time caine ·to execute the
executory contract of sale.
Another 1notivating factor in Tho1npson's reservation of this building was his feeling as a layman that all
of the technical formalities incident to his transaction
with the Labor Association should be completed before
16
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he delivered a bill of sale. But whatever the motivating
factor, it is clear that the parties intended merely an
executory contract to sell this building to Mr. Hardy as
personal property at such time as he could move his machinery out of the building. This was the status at the
time of the fire loss.
Respondent is not quite clear just wherein appellant
contends ~1r. Tho1npson's rights in the premises fails to
1neet the statutory definition of an insurable interest as
t;et out in Section 31-19-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
\Vherein it is said that the phrase means "any lawful and
substantial econo1nic interest in the safety or preservation of the subjeet of the insurance free from loss, destruction or pecuniary damage." Even if the jury had
not found that Thompson had not "conveyed" the building to Hardy, nevertheless it is clear that Thompson
had a legal obligation to Hardy to deliver the possession
of the building when he was through with it, and for
his failure to perforin this obligation he would be liable
to Hardy for the full value of the building for breach of
his contract to deliver the same pursuant to the contract
to sell. ~foreover, he had the use and possession thereof
for his own benefit and an agreement to protect and be
responsible for it to Hardy.
Under the uncontroverted facts, therefore, Thompson had an insurable interest under any one of the following theories :

1. He was the owner of the building subject only
to a contract to sell and deliver the same.

17
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2. He ''Tas a bailee of the building having the right
to the beneficial use thereof at the ti1ne of the loss.
3. He \Vas a bailee of the building obligated by eontract to protect and be responsible for the sa1ne.
4. As a seller who had not delivered, he had a substantial econo1nic interest in the safety and preservation
of the building because its loss would leave him liable to
Hardy for the value thereof.
The Utah statutory definition of "insurable interest" is merely declaratory of the common law, as appears from the following te:Xt quoted from 44 CJS INSURANCE, Section 175b:
''In general a person has an insurable interest in the subject matter insured where he has
such a relation or connection with, or concern in,
such subject matter that he will derive pecuniary
benefit or advantage from its preservation, or
will suffer pecuniary loss or damage from its
destruction, termination, or injury by the happening of the event insured against.
"Great liberality is indulged in determining
whether a p·erson has anything at hazard in the
subject rna tter of the insurance, and any interest
which would be recognized by a court of law or
equity is an insurable interest. Thus, the interest of insured may be personal or as a representative of the rights of others; and while
neither legal nor equitable title is necessary, a
person must have such a right or interest as the
law will recognize and protect. Different persons
may have separate insurable interests in the same
property.

lS

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

" 'Particular Interests.' Persons held to
have an insurable interest in property include
persons having the custody of, and responsibility
for, the property, such as bailees, * * * Whether
or not a vendor has an insurable interest depends
on whether he has made an absolute t,ransfer or
has retained a lien on some rights or liabilitir3is in
respect to the property."
(I ta.lics provided.)
In this case, it is clear that the jury was correct in
finding that Mr. Thompson retained an insurable interest as a vendor because he had not made an absolute
transfer but had retained the right to the beneficial use
of the building and had made himself liable for its protection and for the delivery thereof at the end of the
period of his use.
Again in 44 CJS INSURANCE, Section 183, it is
said that:
"Any bailee or person having custody of
property and responsible for it may take fire insurance in his own na1ne for the benefit of himself and the bailor, and may recover not only a
sum equal to his own interest in the property by
reason of any lien for advances or charges, but
the full amount named in the policy up to the
value of the property;"
(Italics supplied.)
Again it is said that one having the care, custody or
possession of property for another even without liability
and without any pecuniary interest therein may, nevertheless, obtain insurance on such property for the benefit
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of the owner and the insurance \vill so inure on the subsequent adoption of the insurance even after the happening of a loss. See
44 CJS. IN.SURANCE, Section 185,
Notes 20 and 21.
However, in this case, it is not necessary to go so far
in order to support a judgment for the defendant, for in
our case, the jury was clearly justified in finding that
Mr. Thompson had an insurable interest in his own right
by reason of being the owner subject only to an executory contract to sell, or that he was in possession and entitled to the beneficial use thereof or that he was in possession and legally obligated to account for the building
or the value thereof to Mr. Hardy. In this connection,
see
44 CJ'S INSURANCE, Section 180,
reading in part as follows:
"Any title to, or interest in, property,
whether legal or equitable, and however slight
or uncertain in duration, will support a contract
of fire insurance on the property. The term 'interest', as used in the phrase 'insurable interest',
is not limited to property or ownership in the subject matter of the in.sur·ance; where the interest
of insured in, or his relation to, the property is
such that he will, or may, be benefited by its continued existence or suffer a direct pecuniary loss
from its destruction or injury by fire, his contract
of insurance will be upheld, although he has no
title, either legal or equitable, no property right
or interest, no estate, no lien, and no possession
or right of possession. Thus an insurable interest
in property may arise from some liability which
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insured incurs with relation thereto, although he
is not in possesion of the property, and has no
interest therein beyond the danger of pecuniary
damage from the loss of the property hy reason
of such assu1ned liability. Such liability may
arise by force of statute or by contract, or may be
fixed by law from the obligations which insured
assumes * * * The principle, stated supra 223,
that insurance is a personal contract, does not imply that, in order to recover, insured must have a
personal interest * * *

* * * ''The fact that an owner of property
may be able to reirnburse himself from other
sources in case of its destruction is no reason for
denying to him an insurable interest in the property."
Even an insurance carrier, without any vestige of
title or right in the building, has an insurable interest
and may reinsure the same, because it is "responsible"
for a loss thereof.
The adjudicated principles applicable to this case
as above quoted fron1 Corpus Juris Secundum have been
very recently considered in the modern and authoritative
insurance text, Appleman: Insurance Law and Practice.
In the hope that it will be of some assistance to the
Court we will quote briefly this text writer's statements
of the princi pies under consideration.
4 Appleman: Insurance Law & Practice,
~2123:

"The usual rule customarily followed is that
an insurable interest exists when the insured derive pecuniary benefit or advantage by the preservation or continued existence of the property
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or will sustain pecuniary loss from its destruction. Reasonable expectation of benefit from
preservation of property is thus sufficient; or
liability to loss from damage to it 'viii be sufficient.
"A right of property is not
gredient of insurable interest;
qualified interest, whether legal
any expectancy of advantage is

an essential inany limited or
or equitable, or
sufficient."

4 Appleman: Insurance Law & Practice,
§2181: "Both the vendors and purchasers of property have an insurable interest therein * * *"
"The vendor retains an insurable interest in
the property under many circumstances. If, of
course, he has parted with no possession, there is
little question on this point. The same is true
where the s'eller * * * has reserved title, or possession, or has not yet made conveyance to the
vendee."
4 Appleman: Insurance Law & Practice,
§2211:
"Bailed property is generally regarded as
held in trust in the view of insurance law. In
this sense, the expression' trust' is treated as possession of property of others for which the assured ean be called to account. For this reason
any person in custody of property and responsible for it, may take insurance in his own name,
and in the event of a loss may recover the full
value of the amount named in the policy up to the
value of the property.
"A bailee is generally stated to have an insurable interest which he n1ay insure for himself
and the bailor. He may also insure such goods
22
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up to the full value thereof, holding the remainder, after deducting his own loss, as a trustee for
the bailor."
These principles have been settled in the law of
insurance for a long time and the only modification discernable in the latter cases are an increasing tendency
to allow the widest latitude in the definition of an insurable interest in order to hold valid the policy in recognition of the very complicated property and contractual
Interests to which modern civilization and modern commerce and industry have given rise. One of the best
discussions and reviews of leading cases defining insurable interests is to be found in the Michigan case of
Cross1nan v. American Insurance Company
of Newark, 164 Northwestern 428, LRA
1918A, 390.
We believe a careful reading of that case will be of great
assistance to the Court.
Again in the case of
Ferguson v. Pekin Plo\v Company (Missouri
1897) 42 Southwestern 711,
it is said:
''Nothing is better settled than that agents,
wharfingers, warehouse1nan, commission merchants and others having the custody of and beilng
resp~onsible for property of their principals or
consignors, may insure such property in their
own names, and may in their own names recover,
not merely to the amount of their commissions
or charges on such property, but the full amount
of the policy, up to the value of the property."
[citing cases]
23
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It will be re1nembered that the evidence before the
jury for consideration in determining whether or not
Mr. Thompson had an insurable interest in the building
in question was to the effect that although Mr. Thompson had made a de-al to sell the building to Mr. Hardy,
~e had made an arrangement with Mr. Hardy that he
would have for an indefinite period the beneficial use
and occupation of the building upon the specific understanding and agre-ement that Mr. Thomp~son would be
responsible for and would protect the building. Even if
the Court should be of the opinion that as a matter of
law the property in the building had .passed to Mr.
Hardy, nevertheless, Mr. Thompson had retained a beneficial· interest and entered into a contractual obligation
to be responsible for the building, and under the authorities refe-rred to was entitled to insure the same for the
full amount even though between himself and Mr. Hardy
he might hold part of the proceeds as trustee for Mr.
Hardy.
The ease of
Bird v. Central ~Ianagers Mutual Insurance
Company (Oregon) 120 Pac. 2nd 753,
is in point. There a corporation's sales manager merely
borrowed the corporation's automobile and agreed that
he would be personally responsible or liable for the
damages thereto. The Oregon Court held that the sales
rnanager who had thus borrowed the car had an insurable interest therein and could recover from the insurance company the full value of the car when it was destroyed.
24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

See also the case of
Aktiebologet M. Bank v. Hanover Fire Insurance Cornpany, 208 New York Supplement 173 (later reversed on other grounds)
where it was held that one giving a covenant of indemnity to a bonding cornpany which was issuing a bond to
secure release of a ship frorn a writ of attachment had
an insurable interest in the attached property even
though he had no title whatsoever thereto, because he
was bound to n1ake a payment to the bonding company
if the property was destroyed so that it could not be
returned into the attaching officer's custody if the at..
tachment was held valid.
See also the case of
Dublin Paper Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 63 Atlantic 2nd
85, 8 ALR 2nd 1393.
There certain policies of fire insurance were issued
in such form as not to be affected by the making of a
contract to sell the insured property and were also so
drawn as not to cover the interest of the vendee. After
the issuance of these policies the insured made a contract to sell the property. Shortly after this contract
of sale was made a rider was issued for the policy increasing the arnount of the insurance. Thereafter the
property was destroyed by fire, but before the loss had
been paid the insured received payment of the purchase
money from his vendee so that he had in fact received
his full purchase price and so far as he was concerned
had got out of the property the arnount he had contracted
25
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to sell it for. The Court held that the insurance was on
the property and not upon the paynt ent of the balanoe
of the purchase price, and accordingly the insurer was
not relieved of liability by the making of the contract of
sale and the payment of the purchase price, but the insurance company must pay the loss to the insured who
would hold the ainount as trustee for the vendee. It is
to be noted that the statement that an insurance p·olicy
is personal is not to be eonstrued to defeat an insurance
policy on property under circumstances such as those
in the case mentioned. It is submitted that this ease is
exactly in point and in favor of Mr. Thompson's position.
In the case of
Waring v. The Indemnity Fire Insurance
Company (New York 1871) 45 New York
606, 6 Am. R. 146,
the plaintiff sold oil to various vendees, and received the
purchase price in full. The oil was stored in a warehouse and complete delivery made by delivery of warehouse certificates, etc., but the place of storage had not
been changed. The plaintiff seller insured the oil "sold
but not removed" in his own name. It was destroyed by
fire, and the defendant insurance company refused to
pay on the policy upon the ground that the seller who
had parted with title and received the p·urehase price
had no insurable interest. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff as agent or occupant could
insure and recover the full value of the p·roperty. The
Court said:
26
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"The right is put upon the fact that, having
possession of the property exclusive as to all
but the owner, to whom they are responsible, they
have the right to protect the loss, so that it or
its value Inay be rendered to the owner when he
calls for his own."
rrhis case is obviously exactly in point and indeed goes
even farther than it is necessary to go here in order to
affirm the judgment of the Court below.
An extensive annotation on the subject of insurable
interest is set out in
8 ALR 2nd, Page 1408, and following.

It appears that the cases there digested which are in
point uniformly support Mr. Thompson's position.
Again in the case of
Millville Aerie No. 1836 F:O.E. v. Weatherhie, (New Jersey Equity), 88 Atl. 847,
it was held -that where a vendor obtains insurance on
property in his own na1ne, notifying the insurance company of the sale contract, and the property is destroyed,
he may recover from tbe insurance company on the
policy, even though he holds the insurance proceeds as
trustee for the vendee as between the vendor and the
vendee.
Finally the case of
Rice Oil Company v. Atlas Assurance Company, 102 Federal 2nd 561,
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and based on the law of Montana, is in point and
27
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in favor of l\Ir. Thompson. There an oil con1pany sold
certain property but reserved possession and use of certain buildings and equipment constituting personal property located on the land until full payment of the purchase price was made by the extraction of oil from the
land or until operation of the real property ceased to be
profitable. A fire occurred and the buildings and equipment were destroyed and the vendor eornpany sued on
the insurance policies which it had procured on the personal property. The court commented that under the
contract the seller had agreed to deliver the insured
property to the buyer at the end of the term for which
it had reserved the beneficial use and that it might be
liable to the buyer for the value of the property. It helq
that there was a bailment of the pToperty which was in
effect held in trust within the purview of insurance law
and that it had a duty to exercise ordinary care for its
preservation which would give rise to a liability to the
buyer if this duty was not discharged and that this duty
required the i.nsuring of the property. The court accordingly held that the insured in this case had such a relationship to the property that it would be benefitted by·
its continued existence a.nd that it would suffer a direct
pecuniary injury by its loss and that it had an insurable
interest therein even though it had no legal or equitable
title. The court's discussion of the pToblem will, we are
sure, be very helpful to this court in its consideration
of the pr·oblem in the case at Bar. The case is in point
and supports Mr. Thompson's position.
Under the evidence, under the findings of the jury
and under the law Mr. Thompson at all relevant times
28
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had an insurable interest in the building authorizing
hi1n to insure the same and to collect insurance up to the
full value of the building. The findings and judgment
are correct and should be affirmed.
POINT 2. The defendant-respondent properly was allowed to retain the $2,000.00 p,a,id to hin~ by appellant
as the valu.e of the building.
·
In the second section of its argument the appellant
n1akes the obvious point that the lilnit of Mr. Thompson's
recovery on the policy is the actual cash value of the
frame building at the time of loss. This is in accord
with the policy and no issue exists between the parties
as to that bald statement. However, appellant then illogically and without any basis in fact or law proceeds
to a conclusion that ~Ir. Thompson should refund to appellant $1,000.00 out of the $2,000.00 voluntarily paid to
hin1 by the company as settlement for his loss of the
building. Ilere the parties again part company.
Appellant declares, and we agree, that Mr. Thompson is entitled to the actual cash value, and then appellant in its reply, formally ad1nits that the actual cash
value of the building was $2,000.00. As we have shown,
the issue of the cash value of the building and the
amount of the recovery was not tendered or tried in
this case. As the records sho\v, the appellant all through
the trial of the case reiterated that the only issue was
the insurable interest of ~1r. Thompson. Even after the
court and counsel had carefully and after extended conferences \Vorked out the issues of fact to be submitted
to the jury, and had reduced thein to the interrogatories
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which were later propounded, the appellant declared that
so far as the counterclai1n \\Tas concerned the issues of
value of the destroyed ntachi·Jlery constituted ''all there
was to it."
Appellant quotes Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure to the effect that when issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties they shall be treated as if they were raised
by the pleadings, and seeks thereby to interject the cash
value of the building into the issues when that had been
formally removed by a forrnal admission that the value
was $2,000.00.
We respectfully subn1it that there is no express or
implied consent to try this issue to be found anywhere
in the record. True, as we pointed out in our Statement
of F·acts, some evidence as to value was presented, but
this was properly presented and received upon the issue
of "insurable interest," to show that the economic interest of 1fr. Thon1pson was a "substantial" one, as required by the Statute defining the phrase ''insurable interest." For an economic interest to be "substantial,"
the interest 111ust have some value which is economic,
and an expression of that value in terms of dollars as
well as in terms of utility is a proper \vay to show that
the interest is "substantial," and that the building in fact
\Vas an asset, and not just a shack constituting a. liability
to which no substantial economic interest could attach.
Moreover, just as soon as the trial court, inadvertently overlooking the formal adrnission of value, drafted
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the court's finding of value upon the finding of the jury
on the other issues vvhich were tried, Mr. Thompson
prornptly n1oved to arnend the findings by striking the
court's finding therefrom as being beyond the issues of
fact tried ( R 77-78, I->aragra ph 2). Appellant in its brief
cites authority to the effect that a party impliedly consents to the in troducion of issues not raised in the pleadings by failure to object to the admission of evidence
relating thereto. However, an exarnination of the cases
cited in support of the text quoted discloses that in all
of those cases the evidence admitted without objection
\\'as not adrnissible on any other issue which was already
present in the case. Here, as we have pointed out, the
evidence in question \vas admissible on another issue,
so that no implied consent could arise either from the
failure to object to this evidence or from the presentation of such evidence as bearing on the other issue which
\vas set up by the pleadings and tried.
There \Vas no in1plied consent to try the issue of the
~rnount of recovery for the loss of the building. Issues
should not be broadened to cover facts formally admitted
on any such equivocal record as the one here presented
by the appellant. To do so would only create great confusion.
I-Iowever, even if the (;ourt were to decide that the
i_ssue had been tried by the irnplied consent of the parties and that it was proper for the trial court to make a
fjnding thereon, still the finding which the trial court
first drafted into the .jury's verdict, and then later struck
therefrorn, is not supported by the evidence. The only
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evidence on \vhich the court could base a finding of a
value of the building in the sum of $1,000 was the fact
that in the package deal between ~lr. Hardy and l\1r.
'l~hompson $1,000 was allovved for the building. Howrever, it must he remernbered that under the uncontro-verted evidence this was not relevant, rnaterial or cornpetent evidence on the issue of the market value of the
building for the reason that the sale was one in which
Mr. ThompBon wa,s forced to sell a.gainst his will to avoid
a foreclosure, and v.ras not a transaction between a willjng buyer and a willing seller, neither of whom was comveiled to make a transaction. The transaction is not one
which is relevant to the fair cash or market value of the
building in question under all of the established rules.
See
State, ex rel ~fcKelvey v. Styner, (Idaho)
72 Pac. 2nd 699;
Kansas City and G. Railway Company v.
Haake (Missouri) 53 Southwestern 2nd
891, 84 ALR 1477 ;
Richer v. Burke (Oregon) 34 Pac. 2nd 317;
Pittsburgh, etc. Railway Con1pany v. Gage
(Illinois) 121 Northeastern 582;
and
Coos Bay Logging Company v. Barclay
(Oregon) 79 Pac. 2nd 672.
On the other hand all of the relevant evidence which
1night be considered in determining the value of the
property is to the effect that the building was reasonably worth rnore than $2,000.
32
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~lr.

Gatfield, the experienced claims adjuster for
the appellant hirnself determined that the value was in
excess of the insurance coverage of $2,000. The estiInates of a carpenter were to the effect that it would
take n1ore than $2,500 to replace the building and the
owner \vas of the opinion that it was of substantial economic value, to-wit, so1newhere around $3,000, even
though at forced sale he was willing to sell it for less
to avoid the expense of n1oving it away and to get his
rnoney so that he could a void a deficiency judgment in a
foreclosure sale.
It is apparent frorn the entire record that the appellant considered the issue of fair cash value closed
by the pleadings until after the court, through inadvertence and rnistake, drafted a finding onto the jury's ver. .
diet. Then the appellant immediately and gratefully
accepted the trial court's error as 1nanna fro1n heaven and
thence hitherto has pursued the matter.
But the fact is that the issue was settled by the
pleadings and there is no evidence to justify any different finding even if the matter were to be opened for
testimony. The judgment should be affirmed as against
this attack.
There i~ another and additional reason why Mr.
Thon1pson properly \vas allowed to retain the $2,000 paid
to hi1n as the value of the building. The court will recall
from the Statement of F-,acts that this figure was arrived
at by the appellant's adjuster, Mr. Gatfield, before anyone eonsulted with l\Ir. ~rhompson about the value of the
ouilding, and the company's representatives made out
33
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the check and sent it to and deliYered it to 1\Ir. Tho1npson
'vithout any question 'vhatsoever. Obviously this payment was n1ade voluntarily and if there was any IBisunderstanding on the part of the appellant the misunderstanding was the result of its own negligence or inattention. L'"nder these circumstances this voluntary payment cannot be recovered.
Slack v. National Bank of Co1nmerce, 9 Utah
193, 30 Pac. 746;
Richey v. Clarke, 11 Utah 467, 40 Pac. 717.
Apparently the court, at the tin1e it inadvertently
1nade the finding of $1,000 in value, considered that Mr.
Thompson's econo1nic interest in the building at the tune
of the loss was only the am·ount of the consideration paid
on contract to sell so1ne eleven months before. However,
this was not the fact. As has been shown by the authorities cited under the previous section, Mr. Thompson was
entitled to insure and eollect insurance on the entire
cash value of the building even though he had in fact
been paid. He must still settle with Mr. Hardy for his
failure to deliver the building under their agreement, and
the indications are that Mr. Thompson may well have
to pay Mr. Hardy in excess of $2,000 when he settles with
him, as Mr. Hardy under the Sales Act is entitled not
to his 1noney back, but to the value of his bargain, which
under the evidence may be as high as $3,000.
I

After further and 1nature consideration the trial
court very properly allowed Mr. Thompson to retain the
full $2,000 paid him by the appellant.
34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l~OINT

3. The defendant-respondent m.ade no ntisrepr,esen.ta.tion, a·nd the policy is valid.
Appellant contends that the policy was void because
of certain Inisrepresentations listed by appellant on page
25 of its brief.
r~ehis

is esentially the defense of fraud. It is well established that one asserting that the making of a contract, particularly a \Vritten contract, was induced by
fraud n1ust establish such fact by clear and convincing
evidence, and that if the evidence is not clear and conVIncing, a 1nere preponderance of the evidence is not
sufficient.
17 CJS CONTRACTS, Section 605, Pages
1257-8;
Hanson v. ~[utual Finance Corporation, 84
Utah 579, 37 Pac. 2nd 784;
Wiley v. First National Bank, 257 Northwestern 214.
vVhere such a defense is interposed to an insurance
contract the rule formerly was in Utah that every element of fraud, including the element of intent to deceive
and defraud, Inust be proved by the person asserting
~uch fraud, on \\'honl the burden of proof as above outlined rests.
New York Life Insurance Company v. Gro\v,
103 Utah 285, 135 Pac. 2nd 120.
However, in 19+7, that rule \Vas Inodified by statute.
Section 31-19-8, [Jtah Code Annot.at.ed 1953, in effect provides that \Vhere 1nisrepresentation has been shown, the
burden shifts to the insul'P(l to ~how that the misrepre35
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sentation "~as not 1nade 'vith intent to deceive. Ho,vever,
the burden is still upon the plaintiff in this ea~e to sho"T'
by clear an.d convincing evidence, that the Inisrepresentations alleged "\vere in fact n1ade and that they were
n1a terial and that they vvere in fact relied on.
l\Ioreover, Section 31-19-8, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, specifically provides that no oral or written Inisrepresentation or warranty 1nade in the negotiation of an
insurance con tract by the insured or in his behalf shall
be deemed material "or defeat or avoid the contract or
prevent it attaching," unless such misrepresentation
is made with the intent to deceive.
The question of the making of misrep-resentation
as alleged by the plaintiff was tried to the jury and
submitted to it by the court. Similarly the question a.s to
whether or not the appellant here relied upon the stateInents made by 1\fr. Thompson in the proof of loss in
making payment to Mr. Thompson of the sum of $2,000
was tried to and sub1nitted to the jury by the court.
The jury its special verdict found as a matter of fact
that no misrepresentations were made as to the ownership of the building or as to the encumbrances on the
tractor and this verdict is supported by the evidence as
has been shown. Far fron1 establishing n1isrep-resentation by clear and convincing evidence the plaintiff failed
to establish it by even a preponderance of the evidence.
The jury further found that the fact of the sale of the
building was not concealed from or unknown to the plaintiff, and this is in accordance with the evidence that Mr.
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Thon1pson reported that sale in writing received at the
appellant's Denver Office and apparently lost by appellant there.
Appellant relies upon a provision in the policy to
the effect that the policy should be void if the illdUred
•'-wilfully" conceals or 1nisrepresents any material fact
or circtunstance. This clause is directly contrary to the
provisions of the statute last quoted and cannot be given
any force or effect. But if it were to be given effect, still
it will not avail the appellant, for there is absolutely no
evidence of any ~',villful" concealment or misrepresentation. The only incorrect statement ever made by Mr.
Tho1npson to the company was certainly not material.
It is contained in the Proof of Loss prepared by appellant and signed by Thompson without reading. It reported a rnortgage on the building to the Davis County
Bank, \vhen in fact there was no mortgage. The statentent as to the value of the building is modest and correct, and even if it were not, it was induced by the appellant's adjuster who arrived at his own value and subInitted the proof of clain1 according to ail of the evidence.
The most that can be said is that Thompson agreed with
the appellant's 1·epresentatives as to the value. And, as
has been said, the jury found on competent evidence that
the cornpany did not in any way rely on this representation in rnaking settlement. It relied upon the findings
of its own adjuster. 1\Ioreover, under the evidence it
could not be said that a representation of value at $2,000
was a willful misrepresentation.
~fr.

'l1hornpson

has acted honestly and justly
37
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throughout the transaction. lie spent 1noney for insurance and he is entitled to the proeeeds. The policy is not
void for any n1isrepresentation \\Tillful or otherwise.

POINT 4. The cozert properly caca.ted its erroneous order for a new trial on plaintiff's co1nplaiu.t.
FToln \Yhat has been said heretofore, it is now ver~'
apparent that the trial eourt erred in ordering a new
trial unless l\fr. Tho1npson should ren1it $1,000 out of the
$2,000.00 paid hiin in settlement of the insurance on the
building. The jury had found that the pay1nent was not
obtained by any 1nisrepresentation,, it is apparent that
the payment was voluntarily n1ade, and the court inadvertently and by lnistake lllade a finding as to the
value of the building when that was not an issue before
the court. Appellant Inade no m·otion for a new trial but
seeks now to profit by perpetuating the error of the trial
court which the trial court itself in its discretion corrected.
The court itself found that the finding of fact inserted by the court was Inade and the orders for new
trial based thereon entered inadvertently under the erroneous impression that there was an issue of fact to be
determined as to the value of the frame structure in
question, and that the court did not have in mind the
fact that the parties by their pleadings had stipulated
to the value of the structure (R 113).
The original orders of the Court granting a new
trial were erroneous even if there had been an issue to
be tried on the value of the building. There was no reason to subject Mr. Thompson and the State to the ex38
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pense and trouble of a re-trial on all issues merely because one issue had been omitted. Even if the orders
had been otherwise correct, they should have limited the
new trial 1to the trial of the sole issue of the. value lof
the building, which was the only matter then left undeternlined or in doubt so far as the jury or the trial
court \vas concerned. Ho\vever, as we have seen, the
orders \¥ere inadvertently entered under a misapprehension as to the state of the pleadings, and within ten
day after their entry and the entry of the court's finding
as to value which was grafted onto the verdict of the
jury, 1Ir. Thompson 1noved to strike the court's finding fro1n the verdict of the jury and to vacate the orders
for a new trial (R 77-79). At the same time and in the
alternative ~Ir. Thon1pson 1noved for an order to limit
the new trial to the question of value, but that of course
is 1noot now. Upon reviewing the whole thing and considering extensive written arguments the trial court concluded that it was in error and itself corrected the error
and reinstated the judgtnent and vacated the orders for
a new trial.
Perhaps it should also be observed that respondent's
motions were filed within ten days after the filing of
the findings of fact and judg1nent.
Now appellant contends that the trial court, having
1nade an inadvertent error, had no jurisdiction to correct it and assigns error to the order of the court correcting its inadvertent error. Appellant in support of
that strange position cites authority to the effect that
when a motion for a new trial has been den.i.ed and the
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ten day period allo,ved by ~tatute or rule for the 1naking
of the 1notion has elapsed, the court's jurisdietion hn~
ter1ninated and it cannot thereafter grant a new trial.
Appellant then baldly and 'vithout justification concludes that, if after the court has denied a new trial
and the tin1e for filing a 1notion has lapsed the court
cannot then grant a new trial, the converse is also true,
and that where the court has granted a new trial and
retained the jurisdiction of the cause thereby it cannot
thereafter exercise the retained jurisdiction to vacate the
order granting a new trial and reinstate the original
judgn1ent. The authorities relied on by the appellant
here are based on facts which are the exact opposite of
the facts existing in the case at bar.
The appellant also con tends that there is no authority in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which would
authorize the court to vacate the orders for a new trial
in question. Let us consider this pr,oposition first. As
we have shown, the orders for a new trial and the finding
of the court were entered in the absence of Mr. Thompson and his counsel and without any notice or opportunity to be heard. Under these circumstances, the Rules
specifically provide that the order may be vacated with
or without notice. Rule 7 (b) (2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure declares that: BExcept as otherwise specifically provided by these. Rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified without notice by the judge who made it, or may be
vacated or modified on notice."
40
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rrhere is no specific prohibition in the Rules against
the vacating of an order for a new trial made without
notice or opportunity for hearing and in the absence of
the party against who1n the order was made. This Rule
therefore specifically grants to the trial court the discretionary power which the court exercised and it should
not be disturbed by this court.
The motion of l\Ir. Thon1pson to amend the findings
\Vas n1ade 'vithin ten days after entry of the judgment
and pursuant to Rule 59 (b) providing that "upon motion of a party made not later than ten days after entry
of judg1nent the court n1ay arnend its findings, or make
additional findings and rnay amend the judgment accordingly." I-Iere again the court has specific authority and
jurisdiction granted to it to an1end the finding which it
inadvertently and erroneously grafted onto the verdict,
and having a1nended the findings by striking the improper declaration of fact on a settled issue, the very
basis for the new trial failed and it would be idle to go
through the 1notions of a new trial upon issues that have
been settled fron1 the beginning.
In its argument that the court had lost jurisdiction
to do anything except retry the case by reason of having
entered its erroneous orders for a new trial the appellant
cites and relies upon the Utah case of
Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 Pac. 1023,
which held that an application for a rehearing of an
order of the trial court denying a motion for a new trial
does not affect the running of the time for taking appeals, which begins to run when the order denying the
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motion for a new trial is entered. It is true that the Suprenle Court in its decision in that case used s.on1e general language con1n1enting that in California it iH established that the trial court ha8 no po\ver to reopen the
question of granting or denying an order for a nev¥ trial
after disposing of it. However, reference to the cases
cited indicates that all of those cases were, like the Luke
case, cases where the 1notion for ne\v trial had been denied so that the original judgntent was 1nade final and
the jurisdiction of the trial court finally ter1ninated
and exhausted, and there was nothing n1ore re1naining
in the case upon \vhich the trial court could exercise its
jurisdiction.
An entirely different question is. presented where,
as here, a new trial has been granted. By the granting of
a new trial the court has acted to retain jurisdiction over
the case by an order which is interlocutory rather than
final in its character. The case instead of becoming dead
reverts to the trial calendar, and while there the court,
of course, has jurisdiction of all asp·ects of the case and
can entertain any Inotions 1nade with respect thereto.
Accordingly it is the general rule that an order
granting a new trial n1ay be reconsidered, modified or
vacated by the court at any time and the court has full
and plenary power to act in the premises. The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts only a few years ago had occasion to pass upon this precise question in the case of
DeLuca v. Boston Elevated Railway Company, 45 NE 2d 463,
42
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in which a 1notion for a new trial was first granted and
then, on motion by the opposite party, vacated. The
Court says:
"There was no error in vacating the order
allowing the motion for a new trial. This order
recites that the 1notion for a new trial had been
'allowed by 1nistake,' but the nature of the 'mistake' does not appear. This, however, is imInaterial. Obviously there had been no entry of
final judg1nent. Before the entry of such a judgment it was vvithin the power of the trial judge
to n1ake the records of the court conform to the
facts by striking therefroin an order that did not
confor1n to the decision intended by him to be
Inade, or, even if the order entered did so conforn1, it was vvithin the power of the trial judge
to reconsider his decision and, if he concluded
that it was erroneous, to correct the error. And
he could correct a mistake or error of either kind
without further hearing or notice to the parties.
Randall v. Peerless :JYfotor Car Co., 212 Mass.
352, 388, 389, 99 N.E. 221; Wa.ucantuck n.fills v.
Magee Carpet Co., 225 Mass. 31, 33, 113 N.E. 573;
Conway v. Kenney, 273 11ass. 19, 23, 172 N.E.
888; J amnhack v. Aamunkoitto Temperance Society, Inc., 273 Mass. 45, 50, 172 N.E. 884; Peterson v. Hopson, 306 ~lass. 597, 602, 29 N .E. 2d
140, 132 ALR 1; Fine v. Commonwealth, 312
:Jfass. 252, 254-260, 44 N.E. 2d 659. The distinction between the power of a judge to correct a
clerical error and his power to correct a j~tdicial
error where a final ju,dgment ha,s been entered,
is without applioation to a case like the p~esent
where the cas,e has not passed beyond the power
of the court by reason of the entry of a final
j1tJdgn~ent. See Karrick v. W ebnore, 210 Mass.
578, 579-580, 97 N.E. 92; Kingsley v. F'all River,
43
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280 Mass. 395, 397~ 398, 18:2 N.E. 841; l)renguber
v. Agostini, 289 nrass. 222, 223, 193 N.E. 743."
The Sup·ren1e Court of Kansas in the case of
Farmers and ~Ierchants National Bank of
ElDorado v. Wright, 157 Pac. 1178,
likewise carefully made the distinction to which attention is here directed. In that case a motion for a new
trial was granted. Several months thereafter a motion
to vacate the order granting a new trial was filed and
sustained and it was held that the granting of the new
trial, being within the jurisdiction of the eourt, retained
the case on the docket and the court therefor had jurisdiction to make orders therein, including the order vacating the previous order granting a new trial. The
plaintiff in that case contended that it was improper
and beyond the court's jurisdiction to vacate the order
granting a new trial and relied on the cases of
Kingman v. Chubb, 55 Pac. 474, affirmed in
Missouri Pacific R,ailway Company v. Mayberry, 64 Pac. 981.
In con1menting on this contention and the authority relied on the Kansas Court says :
"While it is true that the syllabus states that,
when a 1notion for ne\v trial has been heard and
decided, the court has no jurisdiction to reconsider at a subsequent term, the facts were that
the 1notion was denied, and at a subsequent term
reconsidered and granted. Here we hav~e the opp~osit.e. Under the changed Code the n1otion granting the new trial was properly acted upon at
chambers, and fran~ that time forward the case
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remained on the docket ready for trial at t.he
proper time_. an.d the court had jurisdiction to
1nJake such orders as wer,e proper. Had there been
an application to amend pleadings, no question
could \Vell arise as to the jurisdiction to grant
such application whether at the next succeeding
ter1n or later. The case b,eing rightly on the docket} the v~acation of the order granting a new trial,
while app0alable ?f erron,eou,s, was not void for
want of jurisdiction."

This case vvas later follo\ved and affir1ned by the l{ansas
Court in
Steward v. l\iarlend Pipeline Co., 297 Pac.
708,

\vhere it \Vas held that a trial court at a subsequent term
1nay set aside an order at a previous term granting a new
trial.
~:foreover,

it is the general rule in the absence of
lin1itation by statute that the court may set aside an
order rna de with respect to a new trial and rehear the
motion \vith respect thereto. See
Kentucky C. R. Company v. Smith, 20 S.W.
392, 18 LRA 63 ;
Gulf, C and S.FR Co1npany v. Muse, 207 S.
W. 897,4 ALR 613;
Browning v. Hof:f1nan, 103 S.E. 484.
and the annotations set out in
Annotated Cases, 1913 B 485, 487, and
Annotated Cases, 1917 C 1151.
lTinally it should be said that the effect of the Luke
case is much \veakened by the decision of the Utah
45
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Supren1e Court in
Lund v. Third Judicial District Court, 90
Utah 433, 62 Pac. 2d 278,
\vhere it was held that a renewed 1notion for a new trial
1uay be considered after the first motion has been disposed of where the ruling on the first n1otion was produc:ed by n1istake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. It
is submitted that on the record here that case is exactly
in point as appears from the face of the record.
Finally, we have to submit to the court a case which
is exactly in point and is, controlling in Utah. This is the
case of
Bate1nan v. Donovan, 131 Fed. 2d 759,
decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on November 13, 1942 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It will be recalled that Utah adopted the Rules
of Civil Procedure under date of N·ovember 30, 1949 to be
effective on January 1, 1950, and under familiar rules
of construction when a statute or rule is adopted from
another jurisdiction the decisions of the courts of the
other jurisdictions previously handed down with respect
thereto are adopted with the rules or statutes. and are
binding on the Courts of Utah.
In the BatemaJt case a judgment was entered on a
verdict by the jury. Within ten days thereafter the appellant submitted a motion for a n·ew trial which was
granted. 'Thereafter, and so1ne forty-seven days later,
the appellee made a motion to vacate the order granting
a new trial and the court upon consideration of the ap46
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pellee'H 1uotion set aside and vacated the order granting
a new trial. On appeal this order vacating the order
granting a ne\v trial vvas cited as error. The Circuit
Court held that as regards an order granting a new
trial after verdict, such order being interlocutory and
not final, since it leaves the case undisposed of, and the
parties before the court, it 1nay be set aside as erroneously granted, and this 1uay be done even after expiration of the tern1. It was held that the lower court was
acting within the scope of its po\ver in vacating the order for a new trial. '1 his case is in point and controlling
and this court has the right, power and duty to vacate
the orders granting a new trial herein.
1

It should also be observed that under Rule 6'0 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relief may be granted
fro1n a judgment, order or proceeding entered through
inadvertence or mistake. :Nioreover, errors in judgment,
orders and other parts of the record "arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
time of its o\vn initiative or on the motion of any party
* * *" These Rules also grant specific authority to the
court to vacate the orders granting a new trial which
were erroneously and inadvertently entered as a result
of a Inistake as to the state of the record.
We have observed that it would be unjust and unreasonable to require 1\fr. Thompson, who is not a rich
1nan, to sub1nit to the expense of an entirely new trial
before he should have an opportunity to present his
grievanee to this court for review. For that reason also
we feel that the trial court xnust have jurisdiction to
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vacate its erroneous order~ granting a new trial. This
court has held that \vhere an order of the trial court
erroneous in point of law requires a litigant to sub1nit
to a trial which could not have any valid effect upon the
rights of the parties, the Sup-re1ne Court would require
the vacation of the order by 1nandamus if necessary.
This necessarily presupposes the jurisdiction of the trial
court to enter the desired corrective order, for InandaInus will not lie unless the tribunal being co1npelled has
both jurisdiction and a legal duty to do the required
act. This point came before this court in a case involving
venue. In that case, which is very similar to the case
at bar in its principles, the trial court granted a motion
f.or a change of venue and thus purportedly divested himself of jurisdiction to proceed \Vith the matter, and the
Supreme Court granted 1nandamus to compel him to recall the order and reinstate the case upon his own trial
docket. See
Hale v. Barker, 70 Utah 284, 259 Pac. 928.
See also
Phillips Petroleu111 v. Davis, (Okl.) 147 Pac.
2d 135.
.
Under the law as it exists in this state the trial court
very properly corrected its inadvertent error and mistake by vacating its erroneous orders for a new trial.
Perhaps we should add one additional bit of authority for logical completeness. It is the established rule in
Utah as elsewhere that it is in1proper and erroneous for
the court to make a finding outside the issues as settled
by the pleading.
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Neuberger v. Robbins, 37 Utah 197, 106 Pac.
933·

'

Skeen v. \ran Sickle, 15 Pac. 2d 344;
Guiaque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 89', 129
Pac. 429.
The trial court properly vacted its erroneous orders
for a ne'v trial on plaintiff's complaint.
CONCLUSION
From what has been said in this brief it is respectfully sub1nitted that it is very that apparent there is no
error in the record as it comes to this ·court and that the
judg1nent of the trial court below as reinstated by the
court's order entered on October 13, 1954 should be affirmed with costs to respondent.
R.espectfully submitted,
THATCHER & GLASMANN
Att.orneys for D-efenda.nt and Respondent
1018 First S.ecurity Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
YOUN~
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